And so will the next phase of the war, as summer wanes. In all likelihood, it will depend more on political strategy than on military affairs. Undoubtedly, the military state of play is a crucial variable, but in the coming months of the war, intangible, hard-to-measure, hard-to-predict political variables could play the positive role. Accordingly, NATO and other supporters of Ukraine must start thinking now (and should be thinking long before today) how to prevent Moscow from seizing the diplomatic level and at least temporarily ending the conflict on its terms, not his Kiev. The next ninety days is a useful time frame, especially in America, with national congressional elections coming up on November 8th. For now, Russia is still fighting its gruelingly slow and painful style of offensive operations, almost entirely in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. In the absence of dramatic changes in the next ninety days, there will be no bold Russian armored attacks, no effective use of air power, and no major newly launched cross-border incursion. In American football, this ground strategy is called “three yards and a cloud of dust.” Moscow’s casualties have been high, debilitating logistical and personnel problems persist, domestic public opinion is mixed and uncertain at best, and international sanctions have strained (though not visibly) the Kremlin’s war effort. Ukraine appears to be preparing a “southern strategy”, perhaps aimed at recapturing Kherson and piercing the current lines to reach the Black Sea near Mykolaiv, thus cutting off direct Russian land access from the Donbass to Crimea and neighboring territories . Deliveries of high-tech weapons by the US, UK and other NATO are finally entering significant use on Ukraine’s frontline, although not at the levels and timescales that Kiev’s military would like. Ukraine has kept a generally effective lid on the disclosure of its actual military casualties, but these may well be higher than the popular Western imagination generally realizes. And the casualties among affected civilians, not to mention the destruction of property and infrastructure in the most contested areas, were significant. Therefore, an entirely possible scenario, perhaps even the most likely, is that the war simply continues, with no end point in sight, certainly not in the next ninety days. Here, however, Russia’s political calculations may be biased. Before and during the conflict, the West has repeatedly underestimated Russia’s long-term resolve and cost-benefit analysis of its gains and losses. Eager to personalize “Putin’s war” to demonstrate his alleged domestic Russian unpopularity, Western leaders have failed to see how widespread – and how deep – is the Russian sense that Ukraine and other former Soviet republics were illegally carved out of the country, the homeland. People may tire of reading Putin’s opinion in 2005, but this is his core belief: “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century.” Minimizing the loss of “historic Russia,” in turn, leads foreign observers to underestimate the Kremlin’s willingness to suffer disproportionately high losses for relatively modest territorial gains. It may also explain why Russia’s war of attrition is acceptable to Moscow, where it may not be in the West. In the American Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant was heavily criticized (some called him “the butcher”) for his 1864-65 campaign against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, as was William Tecumseh Sherman for “his march to the sea” in 1864.” from Atlanta to Savannah. Grant’s war of attrition against Lee and Sherman’s streak of destruction brought the secessionists to final defeat, with Union blunt force crushing the Confederacy. Similarly, in the 1939-1940 “Winter War” with Finland, Moscow also bled profusely, but persevered to victory. So it should come as no surprise that Russia’s resolve has not crumbled. Still, Putin can certainly see the danger that adequate NATO supplies of advanced weapons and other war materiel into Ukraine’s hands will jeopardize the gains Russian forces have made to date. Putin also knows that support for Ukraine in Europe, particularly France and Germany, is not what NATO leaders are showing, and that President Biden’s actions (as opposed to rhetoric) during the conflict do not they were almost consistent with deep determination. Finally, signs of dissent within Ukraine’s political leadership are now emerging – not yet disabling, but increasingly visible nonetheless. Therefore, Russia has a difficult political decision to make. Putin will not want to miss opportunities to reclaim more Ukrainian territory, especially since it is far from his original goals. More importantly, however, he does not want to be caught with Russian forces in wide retreat, where any diplomatic effort would be seen as a sign of weakness. Westerners who believe that Putin is not sufficiently aware of the human and material costs suffered by the Russian military are fooling themselves. He knows full well that he needs a break if he can get one on his terms. In such circumstances, Russia’s best option may be this. Over the next ninety days, Putin announces, with a straight face, despite his obvious falsehood, that the Kremlin has achieved its goals. He therefore ordered a halt to all offensive military operations, demands that Ukraine do the same, and calls for immediate ceasefire negotiations to establish an agreed line of control between the forces. Putin will have to grit his teeth to do that, but he knows that a ceasefire will give Russia time, perhaps years, to rebuild its military, restore its economy and perhaps absorb more flexibly, more weak parts of the Russian empire, from Belarus to Central Asia. Moscow will reckon it can catch Kyiv off guard. Obviously and understandably, Zelensky, left to his own devices, would categorically reject an end to the conflict with Russia which still holds perhaps 25 percent of Ukraine’s territory. He is well aware that any supposed “ceasefire line” could become the new Russia-Ukraine border. Unfortunately, Zelensky may not be able to provide a “Snake Island” answer. Without a previously agreed diplomatic strategy with NATO, ideally from now on, Zelensky is vulnerable to the political weakness of the United States and key members of the European Union, which Putin knows and is willing to exploit. Winter is coming, as they say. Germany and much of Europe are deeply concerned about Russia’s significant leverage over their energy supplies. And, let’s be honest, many Western Europeans are tired of this war. The ongoing economic turmoil, whether inflation, recession or both, only heightens the anxiety that, in just 6-9 months, it has become an “endless war” that must end. Declaring the need for humanitarian aid in war-torn Ukraine, they will seize the opportunity of a “ceasefire” to return to relations with Russia before February 24. Ukraine and NATO now need diplomatic agreement against this preemptive Russian ploy, which can quickly win the initiative regardless of battlefield developments. Indeed, in the coming weeks, Russia’s propensity to initiate a “ceasefire in force” will increase as its prospects for significant further military gains recede. The most important element of a Western counter-strategy will be to make it clear immediately that all sanctions against Russia will remain in place until the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Ukraine. The lifting of sanctions is central to any Russian hope of reviving its economy and military so that hostilities resume at some point in the future. If the sanctions looked like they would be effectively permanent until full Ukrainian sovereignty was restored, Putin’s game would fall at the first hurdle. Many other issues, including reparations, prisoners of war and accountability also need to be resolved, but the key point is to stop Russia from consolidating its territorial gains through a fraudulent, unilateral “cease fire”. Will France and Germany agree to such a counter-strategy? Will Biden be so weak before the November election that he seizes the opportunity for a diplomatic “victory” to boost Democratic prospects on November 8? Achieving true NATO unity in a hardline political stance against Russian efforts to divide the West and leave Ukraine at risk will require significant heavy lifting. Now is the time to start, and it underlines why a new government in London as determined on Ukraine as Boris Johnson is so crucial.
